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Energy Efficient In-line Encryption With Selective Round Masking
ABSTRACT
Side channel protection imposes substantial area, performance, and/or energy overhead,
rendering such hardware unsuitable for devices that have space or battery constraints, e.g., headmounted display (HMD) devices. To safeguard user data in such devices, energy efficient
encryption techniques are necessary. This disclosure describes an in-line encryption engine that
uses selective masking. The first and last rounds of encryption are accorded maximum protection
by incorporating all masking features, while intermediate rounds are only partially masked at
steps that are determined as likely vulnerable, or are left unmasked. Selective round masking in
this manner provides data protection with low cost, and is suitable for use in devices with space
or battery constraints, such as HMD devices.
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BACKGROUND
Encryption is important for content protection in augmented reality (AR) and virtual
reality (VR) devices to safeguard user data, and to enable seamless connectivity and data flow
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that is imperative to deliver a high quality user experience. Side-channel attack (SCA) resistant
encryption hardware is becoming commonplace in security platforms to mitigate leakage of
private information via passive channels such as electromagnetic emission, battery power
consumption, etc.
However, side channel protection comes at significant area, performance, and/or energy
overhead, rendering such hardware unsuitable for devices that have space and/or battery
constraints, e.g., head-mounted display (HMD) devices.
DESCRIPTION
This document describes techniques that achieve side-channel protection for in-line
acceleration engines with a low overhead. By lowering encryption energy, the described
techniques help augmented reality (AR) platforms operate within a limited power budget.
Further, the techniques also reduce attack surface by enabling encryption of more content,
including data from multiple sensors, that are beyond the scope of current encryption strategy
owing to high power requirements.

Fig. 1: AES with unmasked round datapath
AES is the de facto encryption standard for content protection. High throughput in-line
engines typically include multiple stages of AES hardware, wherein each stage (also called AES
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round) includes identical logic for a set of 4 operations. These 4 operations termed as add-key,
shift-row, substitute-byte (Sbox), and mix-columns are shown in Fig. 1.
In conventional, non-SCA engines, the key interacts with the plain text in a deterministic
way across the 10 rounds resulting in a specific pattern of switching activity in the AES datapath.
An SCA protected engine amalgamates the input data using a random number before interaction
with the key, thereby randomizing the switching-activity and corresponding energy-dissipation
in the hardware.

Fig. 2: Additively masked add-round key

Fig. 3: Multiplicatively masked Sbox

For example, as shown in Fig. 2, in key addition, a random salt Ra gets added to input
data D prior to the addition of the encryption key K. The datapath keeps track of this random salt
to ensure accurate recovery of the actual data in the end. Additive masking is not
computationally feasible in Sbox because of the presence of an inverse operation that makes
mask reversal impractical. Instead a multiplicative mask is used as shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 4: Additive to multiplicative mask
translation

Fig. 5: Additively masked Mixcolumns

Furthermore, a mask translation unit is required in the round logic to convert the additive
mask into a multiplicative mask, as shown in Fig. 4. Although the Sbox unit consumes data that
is multiplicatively masked, extra steps are incorporated that translate the mask into additive
format that is seamlessly consumed by the mix-columns unit as shown in Fig. 5. The presence of
additional masking logic incurs area, performance, and power overhead.
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Fig. 6: Selectively masked encryption engine
State-of-art high-throughput in-line AES encryption engines unroll the hardware into 10
rounds where each round is a replica template feeding the next round. To incorporate SCA
protection, the hardware incurs extra logic overhead. In contrast, the techniques described herein,
shown in Fig. 6, use a novel datapath that uses asymmetric rounds.
SCA procedures are more effective at hardware points that are logically close to
observable data since these points provide the best model with fewest unknowns for an attacker
to observe the effect of secret key. For in-line engines the first and last rounds are typical
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candidates for SCA analysis because of their proximity to user injected plain text and received
cipher text respectively.
Hence, per techniques described herein, maximum protection is provided to these rounds
by incorporating all the masking features described above. Rounds midway are the most difficult
to attack, and hence are unmasked which saves power. Other rounds midway are only partially
masked at logic that are most prone to leaking secrets, e.g., the “add-round key” step. Although
the figure above shows one instantiation of the proposed approach, other implementations of
selectively masked rounds are possible by assessing secret leakage in various stages for each
specific design. This can be done using standard correlation analysis that provides a metric
quantifying the degree of secret leakage in various rounds.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes an in-line encryption engine that uses selective masking. The
first and last rounds of encryption are accorded maximum protection by incorporating all
masking features, while intermediate rounds are only partially masked at steps that are
determined as likely vulnerable, or are left unmasked. Selective round masking in this manner
provides data protection with low cost. The described design is suitable for use in devices with
space or battery constraints, such as HMD devices.
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